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We conducted business cycle accounting (BCA) using the method developed by
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002a) on data from the 1980s—1990s in Japan and
from the interwar period in Japan and the United States. The contribution of this
paper is twofold. First, we ﬁnd that labor wedges may have been a major contributor
to the decade-long recession in the 1990s in Japan. Assuming exogenous variations in
the share of labor, we ﬁnd that the deterioration in the labor wedge started around
1990, which coincides with the onset of the recession. Second, we performed an
alternative BCA exercise using the capital wedge instead of the investment wedge
to check the robustness of BCA implications for ﬁnancial frictions. The accounting
results with the capital wedge imply that ﬁnancial frictions may have had a large
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A popular analytical framework for business cycle research, which was pioneered by Kyd-
land and Prescott (1982), is to quantitatively model the economy as a dynamic general
equilibrium. The standard method in this literature is to model market distortions and
shocks in a neoclassical growth model, calibrate parameters, and simulate the equilibrium
outcome by numerical calculations. The performance of a dynamic equilibrium model is
judged by the closeness of the simulated outcome to the actual data.
Recently, a “dual” method for the above standard approach was proposed and applied
in an analysis of the Great Depression by Mulligan (2002) and Chari, Kehoe, and Mc-
Grattan (2002a, 2004). In the dual method, it is assumed that the economy is described
as a standard neoclassical growth model with time-varying productivity, labor taxes,
investment taxes, and government consumption. These wedges, called eﬃciency, labor,
investment,a n dgovernment wedges, are measured so that the outcome of the model is
exactly equal to the actual data. Therefore, in this dual approach the distortions are
measured so that the model replicates the data exactly. In the standard approach, by
contrast, the researcher predetermines plausible distortions and simulates the outcome,
which is usually diﬀerent from the actual data.
The dual approach, which was named “business cycle accounting (BCA)” by Chari
et al., has several useful features. First, the calculations are quite easy to make, since the
wedges are directly calculated from the equilibrium conditions, which necessitate data
for only one or two consecutive years and few assumptions on the future equilibrium path
(see also the propositions in Mulligan [2002]). Second, BCA is a useful method for guiding
researchers in developing relevant models. This is because, as Chari et al. (2004) show,
a large class of quantitative business cycle models is equivalent to a prototype growth
model with wedges. Since the BCA procedure shows which wedges are most crucial in
actual business ﬂuctuations, researchers can judge their business cycle models by whether
they can reproduce relevant wedges.
2The BCA method seems to provide particularly useful insight into the recent recession
in Japan. In the policy and academic debate over the persistent recession in Japan during
the 1990s, people have proposed diﬀerent causes of the recession: for example, insuﬃcient
ﬁscal stimulation, ﬁnancial frictions caused by the severe nonperforming loan problem,
deﬂation caused by a contractionary monetary policy, and productivity declines caused
by structural problems. When we try to infer which is the most promising among these
explanations, it is useful to see which wedges are the main contributors to the recession
by applying BCA.
For this paper, we conducted business cycle accounting using data from the 1980s—
1990s, and the 1920s in Japan. Since in both periods the Japanese economy suﬀered from
deﬂationary recessions subsequent to asset-price collapses, BCA results for both periods
are useful to infer the causes of the recent recession in Japan. Interesting implications
are given by comparing our results with other explanations, especially those of Hayashi
and Prescott (2002). Hayashi and Prescott show that time-varying productivity, i.e.,
the eﬃciency wedge, can explain most of the output ﬂuctuations during the 1990s. Our
results show that the labor wedge may have been even more crucial in producing the
recession. The BCA exercise shows that the labor wedge began to deteriorate in the early
1980s. We elaborate on the implications of this result and show that the deterioration
in the 1980s may be a misspeciﬁcation of a technological change in which the aggregate
labor share changes: A modiﬁed BCA exercise in which we assume variable labor share
shows that the labor wedge began to deteriorate in the early 1990s, when the asset-price
bubble burst. We also examine why the labor wedge continued to deteriorate: While the
deterioration during the early 1990s may be explained by sticky wages and a deﬂationary
shock, the deterioration from 1995 onward points to other factors; one candidate may
be that the continuation of asset-price declines worsened the labor wedge by making
collateral constraints more severe.
We also conducted a diﬀerent version of the BCA method, which is basically the
same as the dual method proposed by Mulligan (2002). In the original business cycle
accounting proposed by Chari et al. (2002a), friction in ﬁnancial markets is assumed
3to manifest itself as the investment wedge, which is an imaginary tax on investment.
Mulligan (2002) introduces the capital wedge, which is an imaginary tax on dividends
from capital holdings. In order to justify the assumption that ﬁnancial friction may
manifest itself as a capital wedge in the Mulligan-type BCA, we show that a model with
ﬁnancial frictions proposed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) is equivalent to the prototype
growth model with a capital wedge. We then examine whether diﬀerent versions of
BCA produce diﬀerent implications for the role of ﬁnancial frictions using the data
from the 1980s—1990s in Japan and from the Great Depression in the United States.
The accounting results show that the capital wedge might have had a large depressive
economic eﬀect in the latter case. This result is the opposite of the BCA result for the
Great Depression by Chari et al. They suggest that models of ﬁnancial frictions are not
a promising explanation for the Great Depression, since their BCA result shows that the
investment wedge had no depressing eﬀect. Our results with the capital wedge imply
that ﬁnancial frictions may have had considerable eﬀects in the Great Depression in the
United States, and that models with ﬁnancial frictions may capture an important aspect
of reality.
This paper is not the ﬁrst to apply the BCA method to the Japanese economy.
Chakraborty (2004) conducted BCA for the 1980s and the 1990s in Japan, and she
found that the investment wedge played a major role in the performance of the Japanese
economy in the 1990s. This result is somewhat diﬀerent from our result in Section
3.1, which is that the investment wedge did not have a crucial eﬀect. This diﬀerence
between her results and ours seems to be caused by a combination of diﬀerences in
data constructions, data sources, and simulation methods: For example, government
investment and net exports are categorized diﬀerently; The steady state values of wedges
are assumed to be those in 1980 in her simulation, while they are assumed to be the
values in 2003 in ours; and she simulates a log-linearlized model, while we simulate a full
nonlinear model without linearizing it.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the general method
of business cycle accounting, which is basically the same as that in Chari et al. (2002a,
42004) but includes a simpliﬁcation, i.e., an assumption of perfect foresight, and some
modiﬁcations in exposition. Section 3 reports the BCA results for the 1980s—1990s and
the 1920s in Japan. Section 4 describes the new method of BCA with the capital wedge
and presents the results of the new BCA for the Great Depression in the United States.
Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Framework of business cycle accounting
In this section we brieﬂy describe the method of BCA, following Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2004).
2.1 Prototype growth model
In the BCA framework, it is assumed that an economy is described as the following
standard neoclassical growth model with time-varying wedges: the eﬃciency wedge At,
the labor wedge 1 − τlt,t h einvestment wedge 1/(1 + τxt), and the government wedge gt.














=( 1− τlt)wtlt + rtkt + Tt,
where ct denotes consumption, lt labor, kt capital stock, wt the wage rate, rt the rental
rate on capital, Nt population, β the discount factor, and Tt lump-sum taxes. All quan-
tities written in lower case letters denote per-capita quantities. The functional form of
the utility function is given by U(c,l)=l nc + φln(1 − l), where the unit of labor is set
so that the total time endowment for one year is normalized to one. The ﬁrm solves
maxAtγtF(kt,l t) − {rt +( 1+τxt)δ}kt − wtlt,
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and γt is the long-term trend rate of technical
progress, which is assumed to be a constant. The functional form of the production
5function is given by F(k,l)=kαl1−α. The resource constraint is
ct + xt + gt = yt, (1)




kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + xt. (2)
The equilibrium is summarized by the resource constraint (1), the law of motion for
capital (2), the production function,
yt = AtγtF(kt,l t), (3)




=( 1− τlt)AtγtFlt, (4)
(1 + τxt)Uct = βEtUct+1{At+1γt+1Fkt+1 +( 1+τxt+1)(1 − δ)}, (5)
where Uct, Ult, Flt and Fkt denote the derivatives of the utility function and the produc-
tion function with respect to their arguments.
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004) show that various quantitative business cycle
models are equivalent to the above prototype economy with wedges: A model with
input-ﬁnancing frictions is equivalent to the prototype growth model with an eﬃciency
wedge; a sticky-wage economy or one with powerful labor unions is equivalent to the
prototype economy with labor wedges; and an economy with ﬁnancial friction of the
type proposed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) is equivalent to the prototype economy
with an investment wedge.
2.2 Accounting procedure
The values for the parameters of preferences and technology are given in a standard way,
as in quantitative business cycle literature. Then we calculate wedges from the data using
equilibrium conditions (1), (3), (4), and (5). We then feed the values of the measured
wedges back into the prototype growth model, one at a time and in combinations, to
6assess what portion of the output movements can be attributed to each wedge separately
and in combinations. By construction, all four wedges account for all of the observed
movements in output. In this sense, this procedure proposed by Chari et al. (2002a,
2004) is an accounting procedure.
An important simpliﬁcation in this paper from the original version by Chari et al.
(2004) is that we assume perfect foresight in the prototype economy so that all wedges
are given deterministically from (1), (3), (4), and
(1 + τxt)Uct = βUct+1{At+1γt+1Fkt+1 +( 1+τxt+1)(1 − δ)}, (6)
instead of (5). The assumption of perfect foresight enables us to avoid complicated
arguments and calculations concerning the stochastic process of wedges, which Chari et
al. (2004) discuss in detail. Since the perfect foresight version in Chari et al. (2002a)
provides identical implications for the Great Depression as the stochastic version in Chari
et al. (2004), we adopt this simpliﬁcation in this paper.
Measuring realized wedges We take the government wedge gt directly from the
data. To obtain the values of the other wedges, we use the data for yt, lt, xt, gt,a n dNt,
together with a series on kt constructed from xt by (2). The eﬃciency wedge and the
labor wedge are directly calculated from (3) and (4).
To solve (6), we need to posit a strict assumption on the values of the wedges for
the time period after the target period of business cycle accounting. Denoting the target
period of BCA by t =0 ,1,2,···,T, we assume that At = A∗ = AT, gt/yt =( g/y)∗ =
gT/yT,a n dτlt = τ∗
l = τlT for t ≥ T + 1. The growth rate of the population is assumed
to be constant for t ≥ T +1 . W ea l s oa s s u m et h a tτxt is an unknown constant τ∗
x for
t ≥ T. Under these assumptions, given that kT+1 is constructed from the data xt (t ≤ T),
we pick a value for τ∗
x and calculate the equilibrium path of {ct,k t} (t ≥ T +1 )w h i c h
converges to the balanced growth path with constant wedges. Since the equilibrium path
of ct (and kt) is uniquely determined for a given value of τ∗
x,w ec a nc h o o s et h e“ t r u e ”
value of τ∗
x such that τxT = τxT+1 = τ∗
x and the initial consumption cT+1(τ∗
x)s a t i s f y
(6) at t = T,g i v e ncT and kT+1.O n c eτ∗
x = τxT is determined by this method, τxt for
7t =0 ,1,2,···,T− 1, are obtained by solving (6) backward.
Decomposition To see the eﬀect of the measured wedges on movements in macroe-
conomic variables from the initial date t =0 ,w ed e c o m p o s et h em o v e m e n t sa sf o l l o w s .
Deﬁne st =( At,τlt,τxt,(gt/yt)). First, we construct the benchmark equilibrium by solv-
ing the prototype model with constant wedges. The values of the benchmark wedges are
determined as the initial values at t = 0, or the averages of the values of the wedges for
some period prior to the target period. Therefore, we solve the model assuming that
st is a constant vector for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and st = s∗ =( A∗,τ∗
l ,τ∗
x,(g/y)∗)f o rt ≥ T +1 .




t are taken as the benchmark case. In order
to determine the eﬀect of one wedge, we solve the prototype model, given that the one
wedge takes the measured value and the other wedges stay at the benchmark values.
We then compare the derived sequences of macroeconomic variables with those of the
benchmark case. For example, to see the eﬀect of the eﬃciency wedge, we solve the
model, given that st =( At,τl−,τx−,(g−/y−)) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T,w h e r eτl−, τx−,( g−/y−)a r e
the benchmark wedges, and st = s∗ for t ≥ T + 1. If the derived output is below the
benchmark, we say that the eﬃciency wedge had a depressing eﬀect.
A similar method is used to determine the eﬀect of two wedges in combination: We
solve the prototype model, given that the two wedges take the measured values and the
other wedges stay at the benchmark values.
One caveat for our decomposition procedure is that we assume in all cases that st = s∗
for t ≥ T + 1. This is because we want to compare equilibrium paths which converge to
the same balanced growth path with the same wedges. Since we measured the realized
wedges under the assumption that st =( AT,τlT,τxT,(gT/yT)) for t ≥ T +1, we continue
to posit the same assumption in the decomposition.1 In addition to the main exercise, we
1 An alternative method may be to assume that wedges go back to the initial values at t = T +1,and
to assume st =( A0,τl0,τx0,g 0)f o rt ≥ T + 1 for all cases. There are, however, two diﬃculties with this
method. In conducting BCA for business ﬂuctuations in one decade, it may not be plausible to assume
that people will believe that the wedges for the next year will jump back to their initial values of ten
years ago. A second problem is that the value of the investment wedge for t ≥ T +1 : τ
∗
x,w h i c hi st h e
8also conduct the BCA exercises with diﬀerent assumptions on the values of st (t ≥ T +1)
to check the robustness of the BCA results, and report the results in the next section.
3 BCA for Japan
Japan experienced persistent deﬂationary recessions subsequent to asset-price collapses
during the 1990s and the 1920s. In the late 1980s the Japanese economy experienced an
unprecedented stock market and real estate boom, which came to be called the “bubble
economy.” At the beginning of the 1990s, both stock and land prices collapsed, leav-
ing huge amounts of nonperforming loans. Soon afterward, a persistent recession took
hold, leading to nationwide bank panics in 1997—99, and to subsequent deﬂation. This
deﬂation continues in 2005. After World War I, on the other hand, Japan experienced
an investment boom in military and heavy industries, and the stock market collapsed in
1920. A deﬂationary recession continued during the 1920s, and led to the ﬁrst nation-
wide bank panics in Japanese history in 1927. A deﬂationary policy in 1929—1931 aimed
at restoring a ﬁxed exchange rate worsened the recession, which forced Japan to leave
the gold standard again in December 1931. In the early 1930s the Japanese economy
staged a strong recovery, which is said to have been enabled by the expansionary ﬁscal
and monetary policies introduced in 1932.
3.1 The 1980s—1990s
The target period of our ﬁrst accounting exercise is 1981—2003. We constructed the
data set following the method of Hayashi and Prescott (2002). The data set is provided
in a data appendix (Kobayashi and Inaba [2005]). We assume that β =0 .98. We set
α =0 .372 and δ =0 .0846, which are the averages during 1984—89.2 We also set gn =0 ,
and gz =0 .0206, where gn is the population growth rate for t ≥ 2004, and (1+gz)1−α = γ.
The trend rate of technical progress (1 + gz) was set as the average during 1981—2003.
solution to (6) under the assumption that the other wedges take the initial values, may not coincide with
τx0.
2We set these values following Hayashi and Prescott for convenience of comparison.
9In Figure 1 we display the actual data for output (detrended by 1+gz) and the four
measured wedges for 1981—2002: the eﬃciency wedge At,t h el a b o rw e d g e( 1− τlt)φ−1,
the investment wedge 1/(1+τxt), and the government wedge gt. All variables are plotted
as indices set at 100 in 1981.
Figure 1. Output and the four measured wedges in the 1980s—1990s
The detrended output declined in 1992—95, recovered in 1996 and 1997, but fell again
during the ﬁnancial crisis of 1998—99. The government wedge surged since 1992, just after
the asset-price collapses, then fell in the contractionary policy in 1997, and rose again in
response to the expansionary ﬁscal policy following the banking crisis of 1998—99. The
investment wedge improved from the value of 1981, almost throughout the target period.
The labor wedge continued to deteriorate from 1984 onward. The eﬃciency wedge surged
during the “bubble economy” of the late 1980s and fell after the asset-price collapses in
1989—91.
The decomposition results for output are shown in Figure 2. (The decomposition
results for consumption, labor, and investment are not reported in this paper, but can
be obtained from the authors upon request.) In our decomposition exercise for the 1980s—
1990s, we assumed the values of the benchmark wedges as follows: A, τl, τx,a n d( g/y)
are the averages for the 1984—89 period.3
In Figure 2, we display the separate contributions of each wedge. We plot the actual
output, the benchmark case, and the simulated outputs due to each of the four wedges.
We plot the benchmark as a horizontal line at 100 and the other outputs as deviations
from the benchmark. If output due to a wedge is below (above) the benchmark case, we
judge that the wedge had a depressing (expanding) eﬀect on output. Figure 2 has several
interesting features. First, the government wedge had an expanding eﬀect on the economy
almost throughout the 1990s. The eﬀect of the government wedge is worth noting, since
there is a popular view that insuﬃcient ﬁscal expansion during the 1990s prolonged the
3We also conducted the BCA exercise taking the values of all benchmark wedges as those of the start
year (1981). The results were qualitatively the same.
10recession. Our accounting result shows that there were possibly no depressing eﬀects
from ﬁscal policy during the 1990s.
The investment wedge had a slightly negative eﬀect during the bubble period of the
late 1980s, 1991—2, and 1996—7. This result for the investment wedge seems to imply
investment frictions were not a signiﬁcant cause of the persistent recession during the
1990s. This seems consistent with the view of those academic economists who argue that
ﬁnancial problems may not have been the culprit for the lost decade of Japan (see, for
example, Hayashi and Prescott [2002] and Andolfatto [2003]).
The output due to the eﬃciency wedge roughly replicates actual output, while the
discrepancy widened during the 1990s. Note that the eﬃciency wedge had a large “ex-
panding” eﬀect until the ﬁnancial crisis of 1998—99, since the detrended productivity
remained higher than the 1984—89 average.
The labor wedge had a large depressing eﬀect on output during 1989—2003. As we
s e ei nF i g u r e3 ,t h i se ﬀect explains the wider discrepancy between the output due to
the eﬃciency wedge and the data. But we need to be careful in interpreting this result:
If we change the benchmark wedges, the time period in which the labor wedge had a
depressing eﬀect changes. If we set the benchmark wedges at the values of 1983, the
labor wedge began to depress output in 1985.
In Figure 3, we show the combined eﬀects of two and three wedges, respectively, on
output. The combined contribution of the eﬃciency and government wedges shows a
large deviation from the actual output. Figure 3 demonstrates that the combined eﬀect
of the eﬃciency, government, and labor wedges more closely replicates the data.
To compare these results with Hayashi and Prescott (2002) is interesting. In their
accounting exercise, Hayashi and Prescott emphasized that output due to the eﬃciency
and government wedges could replicate the observed output on the premise that τxt
is constant for all t and τlt changed in 1993.4 They argue that the declines in the
4Hayashi and Prescott formalize the reduction of the workweek length (average hours worked per
week), a change in the Japanese labor policy, as follows: The workweek length h was exogenously set at
44 hours until 1992, and h becomes an endogenous variable for the representative consumer from 1993
onward.
11productivity and the deregulation in the labor policy in 1993 are crucial factors of Japan’s
lost decade. Our result, indicating that the labor wedge is a crucial factor, may be seen
as a reinforcing evidence of the Hayashi-Prescott hypothesis. As we argue later, however,
we consider that the causes of the deterioration in the labor wedge may not be a once-for-
all change in the labor policy, since the labor wege continued to deteriorate throughout
the 1990s and the early 2000s.
Figures 2. Decomposition of output with just one wedge
Figure 3. Combined eﬀect of two and three wedges on output
On the robustness of the BCA results Our BCA results may crucially depends on
the assumption on the values of future wedges. To check the robustness of the results, we
conduct the BCA exercises with the diﬀerent assumptions on future wedges. We check
the following three cases: (1) τlt = τxt = 0 and At = A for t ≥ 2004, where A is the
benchmark value of the eﬃciency wedge, i.e., the 1984—89 average; (2) τlt = τxt = 0 and
At = A2003 for t ≥ 2004; and (3) τlt = τl, τxt = τx and At = A for t ≥ 2004, where τl
and τx are the benchmark values of the labor and investment wedges, i.e., the 1984—89
averages. We report only the case (1) in Figure 4, since the other two cases are similar
to this case.
Figure 4. Decomposition of output (τlt = τxt = 0 and At = A for t ≥ 2004)
The eﬀects of the eﬃciency, labor, and government wedges are almost identical to those
in our main exercise shown in Figure 2. (Note that the eﬀect of a wedge is judged
by comparing the output due to the wedge with the benchmark case, not with the
data.) Therefore, we may evaluate that the BCA results for these three wedges are
robust against changes in the assumptions on future wedges. The labor wedge has had
an increasingly depressive eﬀect on the economy during the 1990s and the early 2000s.
On the other hand, the result on the investment wedge does not seem robust. The
investment wedge has had a more expanding eﬀect on the economy since the mid 1990s
12than in Figure 2. This diﬀerence in the robustness can be understood from the diﬀerence
in the measurements of these wedges: The values of the eﬃciency, labor, and government
wedges are basically calculated from the existing data, and they do not depend on the
assumption on the future values; but the value of the investment wedge crucially depends
on the assumption on its future values, since it is measured by the Euler equation (6).
Therefore, the investment wedge is by nature sensitive to the assumption on its future
values. As we argue in the previous section, our assumption in the main exercise seems
plausible (see footnote 1). The sensitivity of the investment wedge, however, may imply
that the BCA method is not reliable as a method to evaluate the importance of investment
frictions in the actual business cycle episodes. That the investment wedge may not be
reliable is consistent with our arguments in Section 4.
When did the labor wedge begin to deteriorate? While our BCA results imply
that the labor wedge is a crucial factor that explains the output declines during the 1990s,
the labor wedge itself began to deteriorate long before the recession started. Figure 1
shows that the labor wedge, calculated from (4), began to deteriorate in 1984. There
are two diﬀerent interpretations for this. The ﬁrst is that the deterioration of the labor
wedge represents a structural change in the economy, which may be unrelated to the
recession in the 1990s: The labor wedge may represent a declining trend in the Japanese
economy, while a temporary surge in productivity could have brought about a short
period of boom in the late 1980s. The other interpretation is that the deterioration of
the measured labor wedge in the 1980s is a result of a measurement error: If there was
a change in production technology, in which the labor share (1−α) decreases, the labor
wedge declines, since we assumed a constant α when we measured the labor wedge. The
national account statistics show that the actual labor share changed considerably during
the 1980s and the 1990s. We calculated the modiﬁed labor wedge on the premise that the
labor share (1−α) changes year-by-year and is directly given from the national accounts
data. Both the original and the modiﬁed labor wedges are shown in Figure 5. The upper
panel shows the labor wedges in 1960—2000, measured from data of 1968 SNA, and the
13lower panel shows them in 1981—2003, measured from 1993 SNA. Both panels show that
the modiﬁed labor wedge was roughly stable or had a slightly improving trend during
the 1980s, and then sharply deteriorated after the asset-price collapses in 1989—91.
Figure 5. The modiﬁed labor wedge
Thus, this ﬁgure implies that the deterioration of the labor wedge is closely related to
the asset-price collapses or the onset of the recession, if we assume that the change in
the labor share is caused by a technological change in the aggregate production function.
Figure 6 shows the output decomposition in the modiﬁed BCA, in which we used the
modiﬁed labor wedge and the variable labor share. As expected, the labor wedge began
to exert a depressing eﬀect on output only since 1990. Moreover, the eﬃciency wedge
began to depress the economy in 1993, when the bank distress in Japan became apparent.
Contrary to the original BCA results, the ﬁnding that the labor wedge began to depress
the output only since the 1990s is robust against changes in the benchmark wedges.
Figure 6. Output decomposition with variable labor share
Figure 7 shows the combined eﬀects of two and three wedges, respectively, on the output
in the modiﬁed BCA. The combined eﬀect of the eﬃciency and government wedges closely
replicates the data during the 1980s, but a discrepancy emerged and widened since the
recession in the 90s started. The ﬁgure reinforces the implications of Figure 3 that the
deterioration of the labor wedge was crucial to explain the 1990s in Japan.
Figure 7. Combined eﬀect of two and three wedges on output in the case of variable labor share
Our decomposition results for the 1980s and 1990s in Japan imply that the deterio-
ration of the labor wedge was a crucial factor in the protracted recession of the 1990s,
while the cause of the labor-wedge deterioration may or may not be directly associated
with the onset of the recession. If we modify the measurement of the labor wedge by
assuming that a technological change alters the labor share, the deterioration of labor
wedge began as the recession started.
14Why did the labor wedge deteriorate? Chari et al. (2004) show theoretically that
sticky wages, together with monetary contraction, may worsen the labor wedge. The
Bank of Japan conducted a very contractionary monetary policy during 1989—91, but it
began monetary easing in response to the recession and maintained a very expansionary
stance during the latter half of the 1990s. Thus it can be said that a contractionary
monetary shock hit the economy only in 1989—91. A rise in real wages may have been
caused by the stickiness of nominal wages, together with the disinﬂation, which was
possibly due to a contractionary monetary shock.5 A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e8 ,r e a lw a g e s
(detrended), which are deﬁned as output (detrended) divided by the labor input times
labor share, continued to rise until 1994. The rise in real wages seem consistent with
Chari et al. (2004)’s story, and may explain the deterioration of the labor wedge during
the early 1990s. But the fact that the labor wedge continued to deteriorate in the latter
half of the 1990s cannot be explained by sticky wages and a monetary shock, since as
shown in Figure 8 the real wage (detrended) declined from 1995 onward and there was
no contractionary monetary policy during that period.
Figure 8. Real wage in Japan (detrended).
One candidate for the explanation of the 1995—2003 period is that the contiunation of
asset-price declines together with binding collateral constraints may have worsened the
labor wedge. Figure 9 shows the market values of land owned by households and non-
ﬁnancial corporations during 1980—2003 in Japan. Figure 10 shows the sum of private
consumption and investment for the same period. These ﬁgures indicate that at least
from 1995 onward, the shrinkage of consumption and investment may have had some
linkage with the decline in land values and binding collateral constraints.6 The story
5Alternatively, we can conjecture that the disinﬂation in the early 1990s may have been natural
consequences of the onset of the recession. A demand shortage may have been brought about by some
exogenous shocks, and it may have caused the disinﬂation through sticky prices, as predicted by the
dynamic new Keynesian models.
6In the Japanese economy, land and corporate stocksw e r ec o n s i d e r e da sc o l l a t e r a l i z a b l ea s s e t sf o r
bank credit. It is easily conﬁrmed by data that the total value of land and stocks owned by households
and nonﬁnancial corporations has also continued to decline since the beginning of the 1990s.
15that the collateral constraints bound severely in the 1990s may be consistent with the
empirical literature, in which the estimation of the investment functions show that cor-
porate investment in Japan declined in the early 1990s due to land price declines (see,
e.g., Ogawa and Kitasaka [1998]).
Figure 9. Market value of land owned by households and nonﬁnancial corporations
Figure 10. Private consumption and investment (detrended)
3.2 The 1920s
The target period of our accounting exercise for the 1920s is 1920—35. The data sources
are shown in the Appendix. For the accounting procedure for the 1920s, we set β =
0.98. The other parameters were set as the averages of the 1920—35 period: α =0 .363,
δ =0 .0719, gn =0 .0141, and gz =0 .0362. First, we report the output and the wedges
in Figure 11. Output declined throughout the 1920s and picked up after Japan left the
gold standard again in December 1931.7 The eﬃciency wedge remained below its initial
value throughout the 1920s, but rapidly recovered after 1932. The government wedge was
above its initial value throughout the target period and increased markedly after Japan
embarked on a military venture in China in 1931. The behavior of the investment wedge
in this period was quite diﬀerent from that of the 1990s. Although in both periods the
Japanese economy suﬀered from nonperforming loans and banking crises, the investment
wedge worsened in the 1920s and was stable in the 1990s.8 The labor wedge stayed high
in the early 1920s but fell below the initial value in the late 1920s. Neither the labor nor
the investment wedges recovered at all after the drastic change of economic regime, i.e.,
the abandonment of the gold standard and the start of ﬁscal and monetary expansion.
Figure 11. Output and the four measured wedges in the 1920s
7Japan rejoined the gold standard on January 11, 1930.
8The diﬀerence in the investment wedge between these two periods may be due to institutional dif-
ferences in ﬁnancial regulations. One major diﬀerence in regulations is that no deposit insurance system
existed in the 1920s, and there were no government guarantees for depositors. Deposit insurance existed
in the 1990s, and a blanket depositor guarantee was introduced in 1995.
16The decomposition result for output is shown in Figure 12. We set the benchmark
wedges at their initial values as of 1920.
This ﬁgure shows that the eﬃciency and investment wedges had a signiﬁcant negative
impact on the economy during the recession of the 1920s, while the labor wedge con-
tributed to this slowdown at the end of the 1920s. The investment wedge implies that
ﬁnancial frictions (e.g., bank distress) may have played a major role in the recession.
The government wedge boosted the economy during the period. In the recovery phase
after 1932, the sole contributor to the spectacular recovery was the eﬃciency wedge. The
negative eﬀects of the labor and investment wedges grew and the positive eﬀects of the
government wedge diminished in this recovery period.
One theoretical challenge that this decomposition result raises is why the abandon-
ment of gold standard and the subsequent ﬁscal and monetary stimulation were associ-
ated with a spectacular recovery of productivity but sparked no recovery in the labor
and investment wedges.
Figure 12. Decomposition of output with just one wedge
4 BCA with the capital wedge
Financial frictions are assumed to manifest themselves as the investment wedge in the
original business cycle accounting proposed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002a,
2004). Mulligan (2002) assumes alternatively that there is a capital wedge, which is
induced by an imaginary tax on dividends from capital, rather than an investment wedge.
Chari et al. (2004) conclude that there is no need to postulate the capital wedge as long
as one assumes there is an investment wedge, since the capital wedge “is only slightly
diﬀerent from that induced by a tax on investment.” It is easy to establish the theoretical
equivalence between the investment and capital wedges. We show, however, that the
implications from an accounting exercise in which BCA is conducted with the capital
w e d g ea r eq u i t ed i ﬀerent from the original BCA. This result may imply that BCA is
quite sensitive to identifying assumptions for wedges.
174.1 Equivalence result
The prototype growth model is the same as in the original BCA, except for the budget




kt+1 − kt =( 1− τlt)wtlt +( 1− τkt)rtkt + Tt,
where (1 − τkt)i st h ecapital wedge,a n dt h eﬁrm’s problem:
maxAtγtF(kt,l t) − wtlt − (rt + δ)kt.
Assuming perfect foresight, the equilibrium is summarized by the resource constraint
(1), the law of motion for capital (2), the production function (3), and the ﬁrst-order
conditions (4) and
Uct = βUct+1{(1 − τkt+1)At+1γt+1Fkt+1 +1− δ + δτkt+1}. (7)
If we change the speciﬁcation of the prototype model such that the imaginary capital tax
is paid not by the consumer but by the ﬁrm, the last term of (7), i.e., δτkt+1 disappears.
But this modiﬁcation does not have a major eﬀect on the accounting exercise in the
next subsection. Note that as Mulligan (2002) emphasizes, the capital wedge can be
calculated using the data for only t and t + 1. This simplicity in calculation contrasts
sharply with the measurement of the investment wedge in the original BCA, since we
need to know or assume the entire future path of the economy in order to obtain the
value of τxt from (5).9
To show the equivalence between BCA with the investment wedge and that with
the capital wedge, it is convenient to rewrite the prototype models with net investments
instead of gross investments.10 In the rewritten model for BCA with the investment






kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt
¾
=( 1− τlt)wtlt +˜ rtkt + Tt,
9In the following accounting exercise, however, we also need to assume that τkt takes a constant value,
τ
∗
k for t ≥ T +1 ,a n dt oﬁnd τ
∗
k b yt h es a m es h o o t i n gm e t h o dt h a tw eu s et oﬁnd the value of τ
∗
x.
10We thank Tomoyuki Nakajima for pointing out this equivalence result.
18while the representative ﬁrm solves
maxAtγtF(kt,l t) − ˜ rtkt − wtlt.
In the rewritten model for BCA with the capital wedge, the representative consumer




kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt =( 1− τlt)wtlt +( 1− τkt)˜ rtkt + Tt,
while the ﬁrm solve the same problem as above. These two growth models are equivalent,











{˜ ri+(1−δ)(1+τxi)}Ni for t ≥ 0a n dq−1 =˜ r0 +( 1− δ)(1 + τx0)i nt h e




{(1−τki)˜ ri+1−δ}Ni for t ≥ 0a n dq−1 =
(1 − τk0)˜ r0 +1− δ in the model with the capital wedge. This equivalence implies that
an economy with ﬁnancial friction of the type proposed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
is also equivalent to the prototype economy with a capital wedge.
4.2 Accounting results for the Great Depression in the United States
We conducted BCA with the capital wedge on the 1981—2002 period in Japan and on the
1929—1939 period in the United States. The data sources are shown in the Appendix.
The decomposition results for output in Japan, which are not reported in this paper,
show that the eﬃciency, labor, and the government wedges had the same eﬀects on
output as in the BCA with the investment wedge. The result for the capital wedge is not
robust: The capital wedge had an expanding eﬀect in some cases and a depressing eﬀect
in other cases; the eﬀect changes if we change the benchmark wedges from the averages
over 1984—89 to the values of 1983; and it also changes if we change the speciﬁcation of
the model such that the last term of (7), i.e., δτkt+1 disappears. The instability of the
result is in contrast with the result of the original BCA, in which the investment wedge
had an expansionary eﬀect for all benchmarks.
19An interesting result appeared in the accounting exercise for the Great Depression.
Figures 13 and 14 show the decomposition results for output in the 1929—1939 period in
the United States. The BCA results with the investment wedge are shown in Figure 13,
and those with the capital wedge are shown in Figure 14.
Parameters and the benchmark wedges were determined in the same way as in the
BCA for Japan. We set β =0 .97 and α =0 .34, which are taken from Chari et al.
(2002b). The other parameters were set as the averages during 1923—28: δ =0 .0267,
gn =0 .0188, and gz =0 .0233.11 The values of the benchmark wedges were also set as
the averages during 1923—28, except for the benchmark eﬃciency, which was set as the
initial value in 1929.
In calculating the decomposition results, we imposed the nonnegativity condition for
investment: xt ≥ 0. Otherwise, xt takes a negative value in some cases.12
The upper panel of Figure 13 shows the output due to one wedge and the lower panel
shows the combined eﬀect of the eﬃciency, labor, and government wedges. The upper
and lower panels of Figure 14 show the corresponding results for BCA with the capital
wedge. Figure 13 indicates that almost throughout the period, the investment wedge had
a considerable expansionary eﬀect on the economy, while Figure 14 shows that over the
years from 1929 to 1932, the capital wedge had a severe depressing eﬀect, and it continued
to have a negative eﬀect in 1935—39.13 The result for the investment wedge is consistent
with the results by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002a, 2004). They reported that
the investment wedge had a positive eﬀect on the economy throughout the target period
and concluded that investment friction was not a promising explanation for the Great
Depression. Our result for BCA with the capital wedge indicates the opposite. The
lower panel of Figure 14 implies that if there had been no capital wedge, the depression
11To check the robustness of our results, we also performed BCA with the capital wedge using a larger
depreciation rate: δ =0 .06, which is the value used in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002a, 2004). The
results are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 14.
12In the BCA exercises for Japan, we need not impose the nonnegativity condition for investment,
since it always takes a positive value.
13We also performed the modiﬁed BCA with the capital wedge, in which the ﬁrms pay a capital tax
and the last term of (7), i.e., δτkt+1, disappears. The result is virtually identical to Figure 14.
20should have been milder in 1929—1932 and the recovery quicker in 1935—1939. In this
accounting exercise, part of the output movement attributed to the eﬃciency wedge in
the original BCA seems, in fact, to be attributable to the negative eﬀect of the capital
wedge.
Figure 13. Decomposition with the investment wedge: Output in the Great Depression
Figure 14. Decomposition with the capital wedge: Output in the Great Depression
Therefore, it can be said that the original BCA and the new BCA in this section
have quite diﬀerent implications for the role of ﬁnancial frictions in depression episodes:
The original BCA implies that ﬁnancial frictions were insigniﬁcant, while the new BCA
implies that they may have had a depressing eﬀect on the economy in the case of the US
Great Depression. The guidance to theoretical researchers diﬀe r sa sw e l l :T h eo r i g i n a l
BCA implies that models with ﬁnancial friction of the sort developed by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997) are not promising as explanations for the Great Depression, while the new
BCA implies that ﬁnancial friction models may reﬂect some important aspects of the
depression episode.
This result may indicate that the measured values of the investment and capital
wedges are too sensitive to identifying assumptions: In both the original and new BCA
exercises, we assumed that the investment (or capital) wedge remain constant from year
T onward, where T is the last year of the target period of the BCA exercise. This
assumption may be too restrictive and make the measurement of the intertemporal Euler
equations unreliable. This observation and the sensitivity of the investment wedge to
the assumption on the future wedges, which we argue in Section 3.1, imply that the
current BCA method may not be useful in assessing the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions in the
depression episodes.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We conducted business cycle accounting on data from the 1980s—1990s and the 1920s in
Japan. Our results show that the labor wedge, in addition to the eﬃciency wedge, had a
21large depressing eﬀect on the economy during the 1990s and the early 2000s. This implies
that any theory attempting to explain the recession in Japan needs to include market
distortions which manifest themselves as the labor wedge. Sticky wages, together with
contractionary monetary policy, are one candidate which may explain the early 1990s
successfully, but this seems inconsistent with the labor wedge during the period from
1995 onward. The continuation of asset-price declines, together with binding collateral
constraints, may be a good candidate for explanation of the labor wedge in 1995—2003.
Our accounting results for the other deﬂationary episode in Japan, the 1920s, raise
another theoretical challenge. The Japanese economy experienced a strong recovery after
Japan abandoned the gold standard. Since our results show that this recovery was solely
due to the marked increase in the eﬃciency wedge, economic theory needs to be able to
explain why the abandonment of the gold standard and subsequent ﬁscal and monetary
expansion led to the rise in the eﬃciency wedge but not to improvement in the labor and
the investment wedges.
We also conducted another BCA exercise, in which we introduced the capital wedge
instead of the investment wedge. Our results show that the capital wedge had a large
depressing eﬀect in the 1929—39 period in the United States. On the other hand, the
original BCA indicated that the investment wedge had no depressing eﬀect during the
Great Depression. These ﬁndings are contradictory, since the investment and capital
wedges are regarded in the literature to represent the same kind of distortions in the
ﬁnancial sector.
We tentatively evaluate that the current results on the investment and capital wedges
may not be robust. To ﬁnd a reliable method for measurement of the wedge that repre-
sents ﬁnancial frictions is an important topic for future research.
226A p p e n d i x
In this appendix we brieﬂy describe the data sources and data construction method.
The complete data set and the details of the data construction method are provided in
Kobayashi and Inaba (2005), which is appended to this paper.
The 1980s—1990s in Japan The data sources and the data construction method are
the same as in Hayashi and Prescott (2002). The diﬀerence is that we used the 1993
SNA for the national accounts data, while Hayashi and Prescott used the 1968 SNA.
The 1920s in Japan All data except for labor and population are taken from Ohkawa,
Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974) and Ohkawa et al. (1966). Labor and population data
are taken from Umemura et al. (1988), the Bank of Japan (1966), and various volumes of
Nippon Teikoku tokei nenkan [Annual statistics of the Empire of Japan], published by the
Statistics Department of the Bank of Japan. The value of the capital share is calibrated
as the 1920—35 average of (1 - labor share). The data sources are Ohkawa, Takamatsu,
and Yamamoto (1974); Minami and Ono (1978); and Hayami (1975). The value of the
depreciation rate is calibrated as the 1920—35 average of the ratio of depreciation to
capital stock. The data sources are Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974) and
Ohkawa et al. (1966).
The 1930s in the United States All data except for population are taken from the
National Income and Product Accounts, which are available at the website of the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, and Kendrick (1961). Population data are taken from the Bureau
of the Census (1975). The value of the depreciation rate is calibrated as the 1920—35
average of the ratio of depreciation to capital stock. Depreciation data are taken from
Table A-III of Kendrick (1961). The capital stock data are from Table A-XV of Kendrick
(1961).
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BenchmarkFigure 13. Decomposition with the investment wedge:
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